Death is not a success: reflections on business exit by Coad, Alex
This is the final version of an article formally published in International Small Business Journal 
2014, Vol. 32(7) 721–732 © The Author(s) 2013 
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1177/0266242612475104 
 
Death is not a success: reflections on business exit 
 
Alex Coad a b c 
 
a SPRU, University of Sussex, Jubilee Building, Falmer, Brighton, BN19SL, UK  
b Dept of Business and Management, Aalborg University, Fibigerstraede 4, 9220 Aalborg O, Denmark 
c Ratio Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.  
email: A.Coad@sussex.ac.uk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper is a critical evaluation of claims that business exits should 
not be seen as failures, on the grounds that sometimes they correspond to 
voluntary liquidations, or because they are learning opportunities. This can be 
seen as further evidence of bias affecting entrepreneurship research – where 
failures are repackaged as successes. We reiterate that the vast majority of 
business exits are unsuccessful. Drawing on ideas from the organizational life 
course, we suggest that business death is a suitable word for describing business 
closure. Even cases of voluntary ‘harvest liquidation’ such as retirement can 
meaningfully be described as business deaths.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In this short note we investigate recent claims that the binary variable representing business 
survival/exit is underspecified, and that exits cannot be deemed equivalent to failures because many 
exits are successes. We suggest that “death” is a better word than “failure” to describe the 
phenomenon of business exit. Behind this cavil about vocabulary, however, is a schema for 
understanding closure events – we underline that it is not helpful to consider business exits as 
successful events.  
 
We begin with a conceptual discussion of types of exit (Section 2) where we claim that business exit 
always relates to unviable businesses – whether they be ‘relatively unviable’ when taking into 
account the entrepreneur’s outside options, or ‘absolutely unviable’ in the economic sense of being 
unable to cover its costs. Viable businesses that remain in operation even after the entrepreneur 
leaves (e.g. trade sale or initial public offering (IPO)) are not, in fact, cases of business death, but 
cases of business continuation. We then discuss the biases in the discussion surrounding business 
exit, and the trivialization of business closure (Section 3). In Section 4, we argue that business ‘death’ 
is an appropriate term for describing business exit (but that business ‘failure’ is not). Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Types of exit 
 
 
To begin with, let us consider the cases of business survival, as depicted in Figure 1. In some cases, 
such as an IPO or an acquisition involving the sale of the start-up, entrepreneurial exit can be 
considered to be a success. Brander et al (2010, p4) write that "using exits as a measure of success is 
standard in the venture capital literature." We would agree that this type of exit should be seen as a 
success. However, given that our paper is not concerned with entrepreneurial exit, or investor exit, 
but our unit of observation is the business, we can sidestep this category of events. This kind of 
successful entrepreneurial exit, according to which the business continues operations but under new 
management or with new investors, should be conceptualized as a case of business survival, not 
business exit – because the business survives even though the entrepreneur exits. We suggest, 
therefore, that this case should not in itself be taken as a counterexample to the maxim that ‘all exits 
are failures’ because it is neither a failure nor a business exit. We therefore distance ourselves from 
the standard approach in the survival literature that considers merger and acquisition (M&A) to be a 
form of exit (e.g. Schary 1991; Cefis and Marsili 2006; Bhattacharjee et al 2009; Balcaen et al 2011). 
Although reincorporation and change of legal form may constitute a death and re-birth in the way 
these events are recorded in some national statistics databases, this is not a meaningful 
death/rebirth in an economic sense (Harada 2007 p403; Hoetker and Agarwal 2007 p447), and 
statistical offices recognise this and are working on ways of no longer coding a change of legal form 
as a death and subsequent rebirth.  Another type of exit (that is not included in Figure 1) occurs 
when a firm drops out of a dataset merely because it ceases to report to the database 
administrators – the firm survives, this is not an exit in any economic sense, but the inadvertent 
econometrician may treat it as a business exit.1  
 
A crucial distinction, therefore, should be made between entrepreneurial exit and business exit, 
although most cases of business exit will correspond to entrepreneurial exit. In some cases, such as a 
trade sale or IPO, the business continues operation after the exit of the entrepreneur. In other cases, 
a portfolio entrepreneur may continue activity despite the death of one of the businesses in the 
portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The other categories in Figure 1 concern business exit, or business death. Empirical research has 
traditionally grouped all cases of business exit together into one category, represented by a binary 
variable (1=exit, 0 = survival, or vice versa). However, recently some scholars have claimed that this 
empirical strategy is not valid, because it groups together fundamentally heterogeneous groups, and 
that therefore business exit is underspecified.  Business exits can be either successful or unsuccessful 
(Headd, 2003). Exiting businesses are said to differ according to whether the exit decision was 
voluntary or involuntary. In the least successful case, the entrepreneur is forced into closure (by the 
bank or other creditors) because it is not able to generate enough cash flow to continue. In other 
cases, however, the entrepreneur may engage in voluntary closure if she has better outside options.  
 
Ronstadt (1986, p333) analyzes questionnaire data on 95 ex-entrepreneurs (all of them Babson 
college alumni) and observes that the majority of exits corresponded to “selling out” (46%) or 
“liquidation” (43%), with bankruptcy corresponding to 5% of exits (and with the remaining 5% as 
“unclear”). However, "a majority (61%) of all exits found their entrepreneurial careers to be 
financially disappointing” (p335). Headd (2003) also distinguishes between successful business 
closure and failure, after observing that many owners may have closed a business without excess 
debt, or retired from the work force. After four years, 50% of new employer firms survived, 17% 
were "closed and successful", and 33% were "closed and unsuccessful" (Headd, 2003 Figure 1).  
Harada (2007, Table 1) examines the reasons for exit among a sample of Japanese small firms that 
exited. “Despairing perception of further business” is the main reason in 37.9% of exits, with “aging 
of the manager” at 20%, “illness or injury of the manager” at 15%, and bankruptcies at 2%. Overall, 
39.7% of exits are classified as “economic forced exit” while 60.3% are “non-economic forced exit.” 
Similarly, Watson and Everett (1993, Table 2) observe that only 6% of business discontinuances were 
outright bankruptcies, in their sample of young Australian businesses operating in shopping centres. 
                                                          
1
 It may not be possible to identify which firms exit for this reason. One way of facing up to this problem is to 
ensure that any firm that drops out of the dataset remains absent for at least two periods (e.g. Mata and 
Portugal 2002, p332).   
Balcaen et al. (2011) analyze 6118 distress-related exits in Belgium, and 41% exit through a court-
driven exit procedure (mainly bankruptcy), 44% are voluntarily liquidated, and 14% undergo M&A.  
 
We argue here that voluntary closure can be characterized as ‘relatively unviable’ (with involuntary 
closure being ‘absolutely unviable’). We define ‘relatively unviable’ as the case where the business 
has failed to be a viable economic entity when the entrepreneur considers her other outside options, 
even if it generates enough revenue to cover its costs: "If one remains with the current venture, it is 
because the alternatives are less attractive. ... departure requires only that a superior alternative has 
become available to the entrepreneur" (Bates, 2005, p345). The business has perhaps played a 
useful role in the past, but now the opportunity cost of the business remaining in operation is too 
high to allow it to continue. The business is underperforming and failing to cover its costs, when we 
also factor in the opportunity costs to the entrepreneur. It is reasonable to expect that 
entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital have attractive outside options of finding 
employment elsewhere if their business performs poorly, and therefore have higher exit thresholds 
because of their higher opportunity costs (Gimeno et al 1997; Grilli 2011). The business may also be 
‘relatively unviable’ if the entrepreneur has fallen ill and withdraws from the business, because the 
owner now has other priorities (that is, taking care of her illness).  
 
We define ‘absolutely unviable’ as the case when a business fails to cover its costs even when we 
leave aside issues of the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost. Our definition of ‘absolutely unviable’ 
therefore roughly corresponds to the definition of ‘business failure’ in Ucbasaran et al (2012, p26): 
“the cessation of involvement in a venture because it has not met a minimum threshold for 
economic viability as stipulated by the (founding) entrepreneur.”  
 
While involuntary business closure corresponds to bankruptcy, voluntary business closure refers to 
liquidation, which can be described as either a ‘harvest’ liquidation or a ‘distress’ liquidation 
(Wennberg et al, 2010). Of these two latter outcomes, harvest liquidation is considered to be more 
successful than distress liquidation. Harvest liquidation corresponds to the liquidation of a successful 
business, for motivations such as retirement, or perhaps the natural winding-down of projects that 
had always been thought of as short-term projects (such as the organization of a one-off festival or 
other such event).  
 
In our view, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary closure is not always very helpful. In 
particular, self-reported evaluations undertaken by unsuccessful entrepreneurs are likely to be 
strongly affected by cognitive biases – according to which the entrepreneur wants to paint herself in 
a positive way to protect her self-esteem. Indeed, one of the most widely-accepted character traits 
of entrepreneurs is that they are remarkably optimistic (see e.g. Frank, 1988; Hayward et al, 2006; 
Dawson and Henley, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, many business exits that are classified as voluntary closures would have been classified 
as involuntary closures had the business closure taken place shortly afterwards. The analogy here 
would be that of a gambler on a losing streak, who decides to “quit while still ahead” and leaves the 
gambling table before they have completely exhausted their stock of gambling chips. This kind of 
exit is neither a clear case of success nor failure – it is a last-ditch attempt to ‘snatch victory from the 
jaws of defeat’. Marlow et al (2011) engage in interviews with the owners of 15 closed and/or failed 
businesses and conclude that many voluntary closures are in fact anticipations of inevitable failures 
(backing up their argument with interview quotes such as “It was voluntary but actually, I had no 
choice” and “I did it just before the bank did... The bank made it very clear that they were about to 
pull the plug which meant I couldn’t pay the wages so I got there first” (Marlow et al, 2011, p. 4)). As 
a result, we consider that self-reported data on the success of an exit should be treated with 
suspicion.  
 
One area in which the distinction between voluntary and involuntary closure may be important 
concerns the emotional consequences for the entrepreneur.2 Shepherd (2003, 2009) discusses how 
negative emotion affects sense-making and coping with failure, suggesting the term ‘grief,’ in 
recognition that a firm failure can be considered as a death. However, we underline that grief 
recovery is a phenomenon that takes place at the level of the entrepreneur, and not at the business 
level.  
 
3. Biases in the discussion of business exit: the trivialization of 
business death 
 
 
 
The entrepreneur has long been cast in a positive light (Nightingale and Coad, 2013). Back in 1949, 
Evans noted that: 
 
“He who makes 'the desert bloom' is often a very colorful person; a study of him in 
consequence is likely to turn into a romantic product. ... Cold-blooded appraisals of 
the role of the entrepreneur in economic development are rare: glorification is usual.”  
G H Evans (1949, p.337, emphasis added). 
 
Politicians also have a long history of looking favourably on small business owners.3 Favourable bias 
towards the entrepreneur seems to have increased in recent times, however, corresponding to what 
has been hailed as the “era of the entrepreneur.” Blanchflower and Oswald (1998, p 28) write that 
"For many commentators this is the era of the entrepreneur. After years of neglect, those who start 
and manage their own businesses are viewed as popular heroes.“ Relatedly, Bradley and Roberts 
(2004, p38) observe that “the contemporary period is the “era of the entrepreneur”, in which the 
entrepreneur is viewed increasingly as a folk hero.” In this current zeitgeist, entrepreneurs enjoy 
enormous public policy support.4  
 
                                                          
2
 To the extent that failures have negative emotional consequences, they are not considered to be successful 
events for the entrepreneur. 
3
 John Haltiwanger has compiled a fascinating list of quotes by Barack Obama, George W Bush, and other top 
US politicians expressing considerable admiration for small business owners.  
4
 Looking at UK data, Storey (2006: p248) estimates that “the annual total financial support for small business 
is equivalent to a public expenditure of GBP 7.9 billion . . . To contextualize that expenditure, each year the UK 
spends more taxpayers’ money on small businesses than it spends on the police force”. See also Hughes (2008, 
Table 1) for a breakdown of this figure of £7.9 billion. 
One recent trend in the pro-entrepreneurship movement and entrepreneurship policy concerns 
efforts to liberate unsuccessful entrepreneurs from the ‘stigma of failure’ that an uncomprehending 
society has heaped upon them, and to encourage them to start again. Instrumental to this is the 
need to trivialize business death.  
 
Business failure has been trivialized to some extent by popular anecdotes, usually dating from the 
distant past. One cheerful quote that periodically pops up is attributed to Henry Ford: “Failure is the 
opportunity to begin again more intelligently." (This quote is intended for small businesses, of course, 
and not for other ‘irresponsible’ organizations such as Enron or Lehman Brothers.) Walt Disney, and 
Colonel Sanders (of Kentucky Fried Chicken fame), are other examples of failed entrepreneurs that 
heroically overcame the ‘stigma of failure’ to have a successful business next time around. Anecdotal 
evidence, based on old tales from a different economic era, is not a rigorous way for academic 
research or entrepreneurship policy to proceed. However, in popular discourse, these anecdotes 
play an important role in trivializing the death of unsuccessful businesses.  
 
Recently, scholars have objected to the terms used to describe business exits as unsuccessful, as if 
they are pejorative. Bates (2005, p345) laments that: "Value laden terms such as failure and death 
are often used interchangeably with neutral terms (e.g. exit)," and suggests that the term ‘death’ be 
discontinued. This leaves us in a rather absurd and asymmetric situation in which scholars are 
allowed to talk about the birth and survival of new businesses, but not about their deaths.5 Figure 2 
highlights this biased use of terminology. It appears that scholars are only permitted to use positive 
terms for entrepreneurs, and not negative ones.6  We suggest that this ‘asymmetric’ perspective is 
incompatible with the sober evaluation of costs and benefits to which scholars should aspire. 
 
Knott and Posen (2005) ask “Is Failure Good?” and conclude in the affirmative. They write that 
“failure appears to be good for the economy” (p617), that “failed entrepreneurs may be as heroic as 
successful entrepreneurs” (p617), and that their insights “may lead to policies that stimulate 
‘beneficial failure’” (p617). In essence, their main findings on the benefits of failure are that exiting 
firms are so inefficient that their departure increases the average efficiency of surviving firms.7 In 
our view, the finding that exit of inefficient firms increases the average efficiency of survivors is not 
in itself evidence that ‘failure is good’, but instead it offers support to the notion that ‘survival of 
high-productivity firms is good’, or more precisely that ‘the absence of low productivity firms is not 
bad.’  
 
                                                          
5
 It would appear that classic texts such as Alfred Marshall’s ‘trees of the field’ analogy (where new firms are 
likened to young trees that struggle to grow tall and strong, while some succumb along the way) need 
rewriting in politically correct form, so as not to offend the sensitivities of 21
st
 century entrepreneurs (see 
Marshall, 1961 p263, first edition published 1890).  
6
 Note that Storey and Wynarczyk (1996) cleverly avoid the controversial word “death” by writing about the 
“survival and non-survival” of new businesses. 
7
 To be precise, they claim to identify three effects: a selection effect, a competition effect and a spillover effect. 
The selection effect has been described above. The competition effect, we argue, relates to entry rather than 
exit – the competition effect would presumably be even larger if there was no exit (because there would be a 
larger number of active competitors). The spillover effect is questionable, we argue, because their measure of 
spillovers does not accurately capture the concept of the specific benefits offered by failing firms (alone) to 
survivors – instead it is merely a measure of accumulated industry output – “we assume that spillovers are a 
function of the cumulative activity of all firms in the market” (p623).   
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We consider it to be a dangerous trend in entrepreneurship research to consider business closures 
as successes. We are heading towards a situation in which the entrepreneur will be glorified to the 
extent that even her failures must be considered to be successes. In our view, if we continue 
spreading the message that entrepreneurs are welcome to fail, and start again, then the economic 
consequences could be severe.  
 
One way in which business closures have been revamped as success stories is to repackage them as 
learning opportunities. The economic model behind this type of learning is called ‘Jovanovic learning’ 
or ‘passive learning’, after Jovanovic (1982).8 The model suggests that entrepreneurs start up their 
business without knowing their true, time-invariant, individual-specific level of business skill or 
productivity level, and it takes time to observe whether they are viable entrepreneurs or not.9 
Starting a business is therefore necessarily a process of exploration. On this theme, Bates (2005, 
p350) writes "These entrants have paid to take a look; if the resultant learning experience is valuable, 
closure is apt to be successful." In our view, when an entrepreneur learns that she is a low quality 
entrepreneur, this is not a success story. If anything, it is a failure. Learning from failure may have 
some advantages (if the evidence were to show that learning is economically valuable), but it should 
be called ‘learning from failure’ and certainly cannot be called ‘learning from success’. Therefore, the 
closure event can only be seen as a failure rather than a success. Furthermore, whether or not there 
has been any economically significant ‘learning from failure’ cannot be assumed outright, but it is an 
empirical question requiring careful examination.  
 
Jovanovic learning assumes that individual entrepreneurs have fixed skill levels over their lifetimes, 
and struggle to learn about their inherent talents. Hence, in this Jovanovic learning framework, 
individuals who have “paid to take a look” and observed that they are unsuccessful should not re-
enter, because they now know that they do not have the business skills required for success. A 
worrying trend in entrepreneurship research is first of all to characterise business deaths as 
successful learning events, and furthermore to justify (and subsidize) re-entry of unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs on the grounds that their previous business experience was a success! 
 
One useful analogy for understanding new business outcomes is the lottery model (Storey, 2011), 
which constitutes a randomized benchmark or null hypothesis against which entrepreneurial 
learning from failure can be understood. Entrepreneurs buy a lottery ticket (business start-up), 
confident that their chances of winning are ‘above-the-odds’, but having little control over outcomes, 
and most will fail while a few will enjoy remarkable success. The winners will figure prominently in 
the press, while the losers will be largely ignored. In the lottery model perspective, the fact that 
some lottery winners will win the lottery after losing the previous week does not in itself suggest 
that failing the lottery has any benefits, or that it is possible to learn from past mistakes to better 
                                                          
8
 See also the discussion in Audretsch et al, (2004). 
9 The Jovanovic model has been extended to the case of ‘active learning’ (Ericson and Pakes, 1995) where – 
applied to the context of entrepreneurs – one might consider that entrepreneurs can make investments to 
improve their idiosyncratic productivity level, for example through learning (Harrison and Leitch, 2005; Cope 
2003, 2005).  
play the lottery. Furthermore, in relation to Jovanovic learning, buying a lottery ticket that is then 
observed to lose cannot be considered to be a successful learning event. The lottery model of 
business performance can be extended from being a game of pure chance, to other games of chance 
where there is an element of skill (such as poker or blackjack) – the key issue in the analogy, 
however, is that there is a predominant role of chance (Storey, 2011; Coad et al, 2013).  
 
The possible existence of learning effects after previous business failure does not have strong 
empirical support. The crucial question regarding learning from failure is whether there is evidence 
of increased performance after failure, with gains large enough to offset the losses, when 
comprehensive representative data is analyzed. Of course, learning from failure should be analyzed 
not from anecdotal evidence from ex post success stories (such as Henry Ford and Walt Disney, 
whose success after failure is not inconsistent with the lottery model shown above, because 
sometimes gamblers win the lottery after having previously lost) but from large-sample evidence, 
covering both successes and failures, and covering a recent time frame. Entrepreneurs who were 
previously unsuccessful (who have allegedly experienced learning from failure) should be compared 
to an appropriate control group of new entrepreneurs who have no entrepreneurial experience. 
Prior business experience, and learning from failure, should be distinguished from confounding 
factors such as industry experience and start-up size.10 The available evidence on prior business 
experience, and learning from failure, does not find that prior business experience improves 
subsequent business outcomes (Metzger, 2006, 2007; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2011; Frankish et al 
2012). Oosterbeek et al (2010) apply rigorous econometric analysis to evaluate the impact of a 
leading entrepreneurship education program on college students’ entrepreneurship skills and 
motivation, and observe that while there is no significant effect on students’ self-assessed 
entrepreneurial skills, the effect on their intentions to become entrepreneurs is negative. (These 
non-significant results for learning after failure should not be taken lightly, considering the 
publication bias against non-significant results.)  The empirically-observed lack of entrepreneurial 
learning from prior failure can be explained in terms of a lack of opportunities for reinforcement 
learning in the context of fundamentally heterogeneous business opportunities (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Muehlfeld et al, 2012), coupled with overoptimism and cognitive biases on the 
part of entrepreneurs (Frankish et al, 2012).   
 
 
4. Death: the suggested term for business exit 
 
 
In this section we argue that ‘death’ is an appropriate term to describe business exit. We begin by 
discussing some shortcomings of the term ‘failure’, before explaining why we prefer the term ‘death’. 
 
                                                          
10
 The analogy for start-up size would be that entrepreneurs who failed previously buy more lottery tickets 
next time round, in the hope of improving their chances of success. If they are successful, this does not 
constitute evidence of learning from failure, but simply that they improved their chances of success by buying 
more lottery tickets.  
4.1 Why ‘failure’ is not a good term 
 
 
We argue that ‘failure’ can indeed be taken to be a pejorative word because it implies that 
everything that happened during the life of a firm was futile. A firm that is characterized as a failure 
will be viewed as a failure for the whole of its previous existence. Although the term ‘death’ of a firm 
is consistent with the perspective that ‘it was good while it lasted’, the word ‘failure’ implies that the 
firm’s entire existence was a meaningless waste of time. For example, the failed Japanese temple-
building firm Kongō Gumi, founded in 578, was for a long time the world's oldest continuously 
ongoing independent company, before it went into liquidation in 2006. It does not seem appropriate 
to characterize the 1400-year existence of this firm as a failure, because in many ways it was a 
remarkably successful business. It can be anticipated that all firms currently in existence will exit the 
market at some point, whether it be from poor management or just bad luck. Does this mean that all 
of our economic activity will ultimately prove to be a failure? That is an unnecessarily pessimistic 
perspective. 
 
Humans are born, live their lives, and then die. An entrepreneur on her death-bed need not admit 
that her life was a failure. It would be bad taste to start talking of someone as a ‘failure’ at their 
funeral, because many of the events undertaken during their lifetime will be considered as valuable 
and widely appreciated. However, the term ‘death’ does not contradict the view that the activities 
undertaken during their lifetime were successful.  
 
Nonetheless, we anticipate that the word ‘failure’ will continue to be used, at least to describe 
certain aspects of a defunct firm (i.e. the unsuccessful economic performance rather than its 
possible successes in other dimensions such as owner’s well-being and social relationships), mainly 
because the word is convenient and widely understood. For example, the phrase “learning from 
failure” cannot easily be replaced with a substitute (“learning from death” is rather 
awkward, ”learning from unsuccessful experiences” is rather long, and “learning from success” 
would be entirely misleading).  
 
 
4.2 Business death as a politically-correct term 
 
 
We argue, in contrast to Bates (2005), that death is not a ‘value-laden’ or pejorative term that 
denigrates the efforts of entrepreneurs. The dead are rarely held in contempt simply because they 
died. Instead, death is a word that meaningfully describes the terminal stage in a business’ life 
course; it constitutes a clear dissolution of activity. Death occurs when a firm has outlived its 
particular purpose and ceases to operate.  
 
An advantage is the term death is that the voluntary or involuntary nature of the death is largely 
irrelevant. While terms such as ‘rational’ suicide exist (Chen et al, 2012), and this might somehow be 
construed as a ‘successful exit’, we are all agreed that a suicide counts as a death. Even in those 
cases where voluntary death (i.e. suicide) occurs, this is never taken as a sign of success, but is 
treated with respect as the final end of the living being. Even in societies where suicide is, in some 
circumstances, socially encouraged (e.g. Harakiri in Japan in the Edo era), this is not taken as a 
success but as 'the better of two evils' and is mourned appropriately.  
 
The categorization of suicide as a form of death is helpful to understand that the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary business exit is in many ways irrelevant - at least from a business 
population perspective, and from the perspective of net employment (although probably not from 
the perspective of the reputation or grief of the entrepreneur). Self-reported perceptions of the 
exiting entrepreneur do little to change the underlying economic significance of the business death – 
that all things taken together, the business is no longer viable and has been terminated. However, 
one area in which the perceived success of a defunct business is relevant to policy is if unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs should be encouraged (and subsidized) to re-enter entrepreneurship on the basis of 
their prior ‘success’.  
 
In the case of retirement liquidation, the association of the business exit with death is even more 
natural, because the entrepreneur’s expected death, and gradual slowdown before death, drives her 
retirement decision. The kind of firm involved in a retirement liquidation will probably not be the 
kind of high-impact innovative high-growth firm sought by policy-makers (or if it is, it will continue 
business under a new owner), but rather will probably be the sort of lifestyle firm that makes only a 
low economic contribution. Although some scholars have categorized retirement liquidation as a 
successful entrepreneurial exit (i.e. ‘harvest liquidation’), we consider it especially appropriate to 
label retirement liquidation as a business death.  Furthermore, from a policy perspective, it matters 
little if the retirement decision is a successful business termination or an unsuccessful one – because 
few successful entrepreneurs will consider re-entering business after having closed down for 
retirement.  
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
We argue that entrepreneurship research has gone too far in trivializing the death of businesses and 
rebranding these exits as successes. We agree with an observation in Marlow et al (2011, p. 1) that 
“the pendulum between failure and closure has swung too far towards the latter offering a more 
benign image of entrepreneurial potential and prospects.” We argue that business death is a 
suitable term for business exits – both voluntary and involuntary exits. We consider that it would be 
appropriate to try to remove the word ‘failure’ from our entrepreneurship vocabulary, but not the 
word ‘death’. Although we acknowledge that some business exits will be voluntary, nonetheless it 
should be recognized that the vast majority of business exits will correspond to the necessary 
demise of unviable businesses. 
 
In the current ‘era of the entrepreneur’, in which the figure of the entrepreneur receives 
considerable adulation, there is a need for solid econometric work to address empirical questions. It 
is not sufficient to speculate that business deaths are successes because they provide learning 
opportunities – what we need is robust econometric evidence from representative large-scale 
samples regarding whether individuals emerging from prior business deaths do actually perform 
better than a suitable control group, and if the learning benefits outweigh the combined social costs 
of prior business failure. After all, small business failure can be very costly to an economy (Watson 
and Everett, 1993). To date, however, the available evidence suggests that such learning effects are 
not present. Amid observations that the number of entrepreneurs is already excessive (de Meza, 
2002; Shane, 2009), the policy of encouraging unsuccessful entrepreneurs to start again is 
potentially disastrous, and should be given thorough investigation, rather than being based on mere 
assumption. 
 
Further work might also benefit from looking at the subjective well-being or life-satisfaction scores 
of entrepreneurs (Binder and Coad, 2012). For example, if entrepreneurs emerging from self-
assessed ‘voluntary’ exits experience negative shocks to their happiness scores, then this would cast 
doubt on the voluntary nature of their exit decision.  
 
Finally, we live in hope that developments will be made in databases so that future work will be able 
to properly classify events such as IPO and M&A as business continuations rather than deaths and 
rebirths. 
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Figure 1: Decomposing business outcomes: a conceptual diagram 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Acceptable terminology across the life course: perspectives from contemporary 
entrepreneurship research 
 
 
